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Abstract
In this paper the results of a simulation of a prisoner’s dilemma robin-
round tournament are presented. In the tournament each participating
strategy plays an iterated prisoner’s dilemma against each other strategy
(round-robin) and as a variant also against itself. The participants of a
tournament are all strategies that are deterministic and have the same size
of memory with regard to their own and their opponent’s past actions: up
to three most recent actions of their opponent and up to two most recent
actions of their own. A focus is set on the investigation of the influence of
the number of iterations, details of the payoff matrix, and the influence of
memory size. The main result is that for the tournament as carried out
here, different strategies emerge as winners for different payoff matrices,
even for different payoff matrices being similar judged on if they fulfill
relations T + S = P +R or 2R > T + S. As a consequence of this result
it is suggested that whenever the iterated prisoner’s dilemma is used to
model a real system that does not explicitly fix the payoff matrix, one
should check if conclusions remain valid, when a different payoff matrix is
used.
1 Introduction and Motivation
The prisoner’s dilemma [1, 2] is probably the most prominent and most discussed
example from game theory, which is a result of it standing as the model of the
formation of coo¨peration in the course of biological as well as cultural evolution
[2, 3].
A na¨ıve interpretation of Darwin’s theory might suggest evolution favoring
nothing but direct battle and plain competition. However numerous observa-
tions of coo¨peration in the animal kingdom oppose this idea by plain evidence.
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While such examples among animals are impressive in itself, clearly the most
complex and complicated interplay of coo¨peration and competition occurs with
humans; a fact which becomes most obvious when a large number of humans
gathers as a crowd in spatial proximity. There are astonishing and well-known
examples for both: altruism among strangers under dangerous external condi-
tions [4–11] as well as fierce competition on goods with very limited material
value often linked with a lack of information [12, 13] – and anything in between
these two extremes; see for example the overviews in [14, 15]. In relation to these
events – and possible similar events of pedestrian and evacuation dynamics [16]
to come in the future – the wide-spread na¨ıve interpretation of the theory of
evolution in a sense poses a danger, as it might give people in such situations
the wrong idea of what their fellows surrounding them are going to do and by
this in turn suggest overly competitive and dangerous behavior. Knowing of
said historic events together with having an idea of theories that suggest why
coo¨peration against immediate maximal self-benefit can be rational hopefully
can immunize against such destructive thoughts and actions.
From the beginning the prisoner’s dilemma was investigated in an iterated
way [17, 18], often including that the ability of strategies to hark back on course
of events of the tournament [2, 19] was unlimited, i.e. they had a memory
potentially including every own and opponents’ steps. Despite the possibility
of using more memory the first strategy emerging as winner – tit-for-tat – did
with a memory of only the most recent action of the opponent. Another famous
and successful strategy – pavlov – also makes only use of a small memory: it
just needs to remember its own and the opponent’s action. In this contribution
the effect of an extension of the memory up to the three latest actions of the
opponent and up to two latest own actions is investigated.
In the course of discussion of the prisoner’s dilemma a number of meth-
ods have been introduced like probabilistic strategies to model errors (“noise”)
[20], evolutionary (ecologic) investigation [2], spatial relations (players only play
against spatially neighbored opponents) [21–30], and creation of strategies by
genetic programming [3, 20, 31–33]. Most of these can be combined. For an
overview on further variants see review works like [34, 35].
Contrary to these elaborate methods, a main guiding line in this work is to
avoid arbitrary and probabilistic decisions like choosing a subset of strategies of a
class or locating strategies spatially in neighborhoods; spatial variants as well as
a genetic approach are excluded. Instead each strategy of the class participates
and plays against each other. A consequence from investigating complete classes
is that it is impossible to have a continuous element as constructing element of
a strategy; this forbids probabilistic strategies. The round-robin mode as well
– at least in parts – is a consequence of avoiding arbitrariness: drawing lots to
choose pairs of competitors like in tournaments would bring in a probabilistic
element. In other words: the source code written for this investigation does not
at any point make use of random numbers. It is a deterministic brute force
calculation of a large number of strategies and a very large number of single
games. The relevance lies not in modeling a specific system of reality, but in
the completeness of the investigated class and in general the small degree of
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freedom (arbitrariness) of the system.
By the strictness and generality of the procedure, a strategy can be seen as
a Mealy automaton or the iterative game between two strategies as a Moore
machine [36–39] respectively a spatially zero-dimensional cellular automaton
[40, 41] (see section 3).
2 Definition of a Strategy
In the sense of this paper a strategy with a memory size n has n + 1 sub-
strategies to define the action in the first, second, ... nth and any further
iteration. The sub-strategy for the first iteration only decides, how a strategy
starts the tournament, the sub-strategy for the second iteration depends on the
action(s) of the first iteration, the sub-strategy for the third iteration depends
on the actions in the first and second iteration (if memory size is larger one)
and the sub-strategy for the (N > n)th iteration depends on the actions in the
(N − n) to (N − 1)st iteration (compare Figure 1).
A similar approach has been followed in [42], but there are differences in
the definition of the class concerning the behavior in the first n − 1 iterations
and most important it has not been used for a round-robin tournament with all
strategies of a class, but combined with a genetic approach.
Another investigation dealing with effects of memory size is [43]. The differ-
ence there is that the strategies are probabilistic and (therefore) not all strategies
participate in the process.
2.1 Data Size of a Strategy, Number of Strategies, and
Number of Games
Since at the beginning there is no information from the opponent a strategy
consists of a decision, how to begin an iterated game (one bit). In the second
round, there is only information on one past step from the opponent, so the
strategy includes the decision how to react on this (two bits), the third step is
still part of the starting phase and therefore also has its own part of the strategy
(four bits, if the decision does not depend on a strategy’s own preceding action).
Therefore there are 128 strategies if there is a no-own-two-opponent memory.
Finally with size-three memory, one has eight more bits. As an example in
Figure 1 it is shown, how one calculates the number combination (1/2/12/240)
from the tit-for-tat strategy. These 15 bits lead to a total of N = 32768 different
strategies. If each strategy plays against each other strategy and against itself
one has to calculate N · (N + 1)/2 = 229 different iterated prisoner’s dilemmas.
Table 1 sums up these numbers for different memorysizes. To remember the
last n actions of a pair of strategies, one needs 2n bits and for the results of
a strategy over the course of iterations one needs – depending on the kind of
evaluation – a few bytes for each pair of strategies. The number of pairs of
strategies – and this is the limiting component – grows at least approximately
like 22
n+2−3. On today’s common PCs RAM demands are therefore trivial up
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to a memory size of n = 2, in the lower range of 64-bit technology (some GBs
of RAM) for n = 3, and totally unavailable for n = 4 and larger (more than an
exabyte).
Figure 1: Tit-for-tat as strategy (1/2/12/240). The part (1/2/12) applies only
in the starting phase, when only no, one or two earlier states of the opponent
exist. So, coo¨peration is coded with a “1”, defection with a “0”. If a strategy
remembers also its own past actions then these are always stored in the lower
bits, i.e. for example of the triples, the leftmost would indicate a strategy’s own
preceding action and the middle and right would indicate the second to last and
last action of the opponent (“low to high” is “left to right”).
3 The Cellular Automata Perspective
This section serves to have another perspective at the system in terms of cellular
automata. This can help to get a visual idea of the system dynamics. However,
the reader may well skip this and proceed to the next section.
Wolfram’s elementary cellular automata are defined (or interpreted) to exist
in one spatial plus one temporal dimension. However, one can also apply the
rules to a point-like cellular automaton with memory. Figure 2 shows an example
for this. One can also interpret this system not as a cellular automaton that
has a memory and a binary state, but as an automaton that can have one of
eight states with transitions between the states being restricted. For the full
set of 256 rules each state can be reached in principle from two other states
and from a particular state also two states can be reached. Choosing a specific
rule is selecting one incoming and one outgoing state. This is exemplified in
Figure 3 for rule 110. For the iterated prisoner’s dilemma one needs two such
cellular automata that interact that determine their next state from the data of
the other automaton as shown in Figure 4. It is of course possible to interpret
two interacting cellular automata as one single point-like cellular automaton
4
Memory size #Bits #Strategies #Games in one iteration
self /other
0 / 0 1 2 1 resp. 3
0 / 1 3 8 28 resp. 36
1 / 1 5 32 496 resp. 528
0 / 2 7 128 8,128 resp. 8,256
1 / 2 13 8,192 ≈ 33.55 · 106
2 / 1 13 8,192 ≈ 33.55 · 106
0 / 3 15 32,768 ≈ 536.8 · 106
2 / 2 21 2,097,152 ≈ 2.199 · 109
1 / 3 29 536,870,912 ≈ 144.1 · 1015
3 / 1 29 536,870,912 ≈ 144.1 · 1015
0 / 4 31 2,147,483,648 ≈ 2.306 · 1018
Table 1: Number of bits (b) to represent a strategy, number of strategies (2b),
and number of prisoner’s dilemma games in an iteration step in a round-robin
tournament (2b−1(2b± 1)) for different memory sizes. This leads to a computa-
tional effort shown in Table 2.
Memory size RAM Time
self /other
0 / 0 10 B insignificant
0 / 1 100 B insignificant
1 / 1 10 KB s .. min
0 / 2 100 KB s .. min
1 / 2 100 MB min .. d
2 / 1 100 MB min .. d
0 / 3 10 GB h .. weeks
2 / 2 10 TB d .. year
1 / 3 1 EB > year
3 / 1 1 EB > year
0 / 4 10 EB decade(s) (?)
Table 2: Magnitudes of computational resource requirements (on a double quad
core Intel Xeon 5320). The computation time depends significantly on the
number of different payoff matrices to be investigated. Large scale simulations
with parallel computing of the iterated prisoner’s dilemma has also been dealt
with in [44].
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Figure 2: Rule 110 applied self-referentially to a point-like cellular automaton
with memory. Note: as time increases toward the right and the most recent
state is meant to be stored in the highest bit, but higher bits are notated to the
left, one has to reverse the bits compared to Wolfram’s standard notation.
C(2) D(2)
C(1) R R S T
D(1) T S P P
Table 3: General payoff matrix
with a larger set of states. Then Figure 4 would translate to Figure 5. One
now again could draw a transition graph (with 64 nodes that all have one of
four possible incoming and outgoing links or a specific combination of rules) for
further theoretical analysis. For this work we shall now abandon these basic and
theoretical considerations and just adhere to the fact that the implementation
of the process can be seen as a cellular automaton, more precisely an enormous
number of combination of interacting very simple cellular automata.
4 Payoff Matrix
The four values T , R, P , and S of the payoff matrix (see Table 3) need to fulfill
the relation
T > R > P > S (1)
to be faced with a prisoner’s dilemma. For the purpose of this contribution one
can choose S = 0 without loss of generality, as whenever the payoff matrix is
applied all strategies have played the same number of games. In addition to
equation 1 it is often postulated that
2R > T (2)
holds.
The equation
T + S = P +R (3)
6
Figure 3: Transition graph for rule 110 (black links) and possible links or other
rules (grey links).
7
Figure 4: Rule 184 and rule 110 interacting. As a model for the iterated pris-
oner’s dilemma the dependence here models the situation that a prisoner re-
members the three preceding moves of the opponent but none of its own.
Figure 5: Figure 4 as one single cellular automaton. If the states of both
automata are white (black) the state here is shown as well as white (black). If
184 is white (black) and 110 black (white), the state here is yellow (red).
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as well marks a special set of payoff matrices, as those values can be seen as
model of a trading process, where the exchanged good has a higher value for
the buyer i than the seller j:
pij = α+ βδi − γδj (4)
where δ = 1, if a player coo¨perates and δ = 0 if he defects. Therefore β can
directly be interpreted as the “gain from receiving” value and γ the “cost from
giving” value. α is a constant to guarantee pij ≥ 0. T , R, P for technical
convenience, and S can be calculated from these: T = α + β, R = α + β − γ,
P = α, and S = α− γ. Aside from the descriptive interpretation as “gain from
receive” and “cost to give” this reparametrization has the advantage that the
original condition equation (1) and the additional conditions equation (2) and
S = 0 reduce to β > γ = α. Furthermore it is the form of the basic equation in
George Price’s model for the evolution of coo¨peration [45, 46].
As we do not only want to investigate payoff matrices, where equations (2)
and (3) hold, we rewrite
T = (1 + a+ b)P (5)
R = (1 + a)P (6)
a = α/P − 1 > 0 (7)
b = β/P > 0 (8)
In principle one could set P = 1 without loss of generality, but then it was not
possible to write all combinations holds/does not hold of equations (2) and (3)
with integer-valued T and R. Now equation (3) simply can be written as
b = 1 (9)
and shall be investigated as one variant next to b > 1 and b < 1. And equation
(2) writes
a+ 1 > b. (10)
Here as well a + 1 = b and a + 1 < b will be investigated (always taking care
that a > 0 and b > 0 hold). Finally, a(<,=, >)1 and a(<,=, >)b are relevant
conditions, if it’s possible to distinguish in this way.
Obviously not all combinations of these conditions can hold simultaneously.
(a+1 < b, b < 1) for example has no allowed solution. The allowed combinations
and the values for T , R, and P are shown in Table 4. For each combination
of conditions an infinite number of values could have been found. One could
have chosen to interpret “>” as “much greater than” but then selecting specific
numbers in a way would have been arbitrary. So the smallest numbers to fulfill
a set of conditions have been chosen as representatives.
5 Iteration, Tournament, and Scoring
In an iteration step all strategies play a prisoner’s dilemma against any of the
other strategies and themselves. For this a strategy calculates its action from
9
Cond. 1 Cond. 2 Cond. 3 T R P T = R+ P 2R > T
b = 1 a = 1 3 2 1 holds holds
b = 1 a > 1 4 3 1 holds holds
b = 1 a < 1 5 3 2 holds holds
b < 1 a = 1 5 4 2 holds
b < 1 a > 1 6 5 2 holds
b < 1 a < 1 b = a 4 3 2 holds
b < 1 a < 1 b > a 6 4 3 holds
b < 1 a < 1 b < a 6 5 3 holds
b > 1 b < a+ 1 a > 1 5 3 1 holds
b > 1 b < a+ 1 a = 1 7 4 2 holds
b > 1 b < a+ 1 a < 1 9 5 3 holds
b > 1 b = a+ 1 a = 1 4 2 1
b > 1 b > a+ 1 a = 1 5 2 1
b > 1 b = a+ 1 a > 1 6 3 1
b > 1 b > a+ 1 a > 1 7 3 1
b > 1 b = a+ 1 a < 1 6 3 2
b > 1 b > a+ 1 a < 1 7 3 2
Table 4: Investigated variants of values for the payoff matrix.
the preceding actions of the specific opponent. If N tij , N
r
ij , N
p
ij , N
s
ij are the
counters, how often strategy i received a T , R, P or S payoff playing against a
specific strategy j, in each iteration step for each i and each j one of the four
Nxij is increased by one.
Now all the payoff matrices from Table 4 are applied one after the other to
calculate for each payoff matrix for each strategy i the total payoff G1i :
G1i =
∑
j
TNTij +RN
R
ij + PN
P
ij (11)
The strategy (or set of strategies) i yielding the highest G1i is one of the
main results for a specific iteration round and a specific payoff matrix.
Then the tournament is started. Each tournament round g is started by
calculating the average payoff of the preceding tournament round:
Gg =
∑
iG
g
i δ
g
i∑
i δ
g
i
(12)
where δgi = 1, if strategy i was still participating in the tournament in tourna-
ment round g and δgi = 0 else. Then δ
g+1
i is set to 0, if δ
g
i = 0, or if a strategy
scored below average:
Ggi < G
g (13)
The payoff for the next tournament round g+ 1 is calculated then for all strate-
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gies still participating in the tournament:
Gg+1i =
∑
j
(TNTij +RN
R
ij + PN
P
ij )δ
g+1
j (14)
The tournament ends, if only one strategy remains or if all remaining strategies
score equal in a tournament round (i.e. they have identical Ggi ). The strategies,
which manage to emerge as winners of such a tournament are the second main
result for a specific iteration step and a specific payoff matrix.
Such an elimination tournament can be interpreted as an evolutionary tour-
nament, where the frequency values for the strategies can only take the values
f = 0 and f = 1.
To state it explicitly: all strategies participate again in the next iteration
step for another first round of the tournament. The elimination process only
takes place within an iteration step and not across iteration steps, and there is
no prisoner’s dilemma game played in or between the rounds of a tournament.
As all strategies are deterministic this procedure is equivalent to playing the
prisoner’s dilemma a fixed number of iterations, evaluate the scores, eliminate
all strategies scoring below average and play again the fixed number of iterations
with the remaining strategies, and so on.
6 Results
In this section for all payoff matrices of Table 4 the strategies are given that for
large numbers of iteration steps have the highest payoff G1i in the first round of
the tournament and those strategies that win the tournament – if the system
stabilizes to one winner. Additionally the iteration round is given, when this
winning strategy (strategies) appeared for the first time to stay continuously
until the last calculated iteration. This implies that for a certain payoff matrix
prior to this iteration the number of iterations is important for the question
which strategy will emerge as the best (in the sense described in section 5).
6.1 Results for No-Own-One-Opponent Memory
With only one action to remember, there are just 8 strategies (named (0/0) to
(1/3)). (0/0) never coo¨perates, (1/3) always. TFT is (1/2). 1000 iteration steps
were done. It’s safe to say that this is sufficiently long, as the results – shown
in tables 5 and 6 – stabilize at latest in iteration step 16 (respectively 179).
6.2 Results for One-Own-One-Opponent Memory
With this configuration beginning with the second iteration step strategies base
their decision on two bits, one (the higher bit) in which is encoded the action
of their opponent and one in which is remembered their own action. For an
overview in Table 7 numbers and behaviors are compared.
For this and all further settings 10,000 iterations (and in special cases more)
have been simulated. Results are shown in tables 8 and 9.
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T R P First it. G1i Tournament
3 2 1 8 (0/0) (1/2)
4 3 1 4 (0/0) (1/2)
5 3 2 16 (0/0) (1/2)
5 4 2 6 (0/0) (1/2)
6 5 2 4 (0/0) (1/2)
4 3 2 10 (0/0) (1/2)
6 4 3 14 (0/0) (1/2)
6 5 3 6 (0/0) (1/2)
5 3 1 4 (0/0) (0/0)
7 4 2 4 (0/0) (0/0)
9 5 3 4 (0/0) (0/0)
4 2 1 4 (0/0) (0/0)
5 2 1 4 (0/0) (0/0)
6 3 1 4 (0/0) (0/0)
7 3 1 4 (0/0) (0/0)
6 3 2 4 (0/0) (0/0)
7 3 2 4 (0/0) (0/0)
Table 5: Results for (no own / one opponent) memory, if strategies also play
against themselves. “First it.” denotes the iteration round, at which the results
remain the same until iteration round 1000. TFT wins the tournament, if b ≤ 1
(regardless of a), while a comparison of the whole set of strategies is always won
by ALLD (defect always).
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T R P First it. G1i Tournament
3 2 1 8 (0/0) (0/0)
4 3 1 8 (0/0) (0/0)
5 3 2 12 (0/0) (0/0)
5 4 2 162 (2) (0/0) (0/2), (1/2)
6 5 2 179 (2) (0/0) (0/2), (1/2)
4 3 2 108 (2) (0/0) (0/0), (0/2)
6 4 3 168 (2) (0/0) (0/0), (0/2)
6 5 3 80 (2) (0/0) (0/0), (0/2)
5 3 1 4 (0/0) (0/0)
7 4 2 7 (0/0) (0/0)
9 5 3 8 (0/0) (0/0)
4 2 1 4 (0/0) (0/0)
5 2 1 4 (0/0) (0/0)
6 3 1 4 (0/0) (0/0)
7 3 1 4 (0/0) (0/0)
6 3 2 8 (0/0) (0/0)
7 3 2 4 (0/0) (0/0)
Table 6: Results for (no own / one opponent) memory, if strategies do not play
against themselves. Numbers in brackets in column “First it.” denote period
length, if results oscillate. Entries marked in italics each second iteration do not
co-win the tournament, if the results alternate. This setting is much less prone
to lead to coo¨peration than if strategies also do play against themselves.
numbers for strategies latest own latest opponent
(?/1) D D
(?/2) C D
(?/4) D C
(?/8) C C
Table 7: A strategy coo¨perates, if its number is composed of the elements of
this table. TFT for example is (1/12) (coo¨perate, if line 3 or line four of this
table is remembered: (1/4+8)).
13
T R P First it. G1i Tournament
3 2 1 8 set of 4 (1/8), (1/12)
4 3 1 66 (1/8) (1/8), (1/9), (1/12), (1/13)
5 3 2 18 set of 4 (1/8), (1/12)
5 4 2 21 (1/8) (1/8), (1/12)
6 5 2 18 (1/8) (1/8), (1/9), (1/12), (1/13)
4 3 2 12 set of 4 (1/8), (1/12)
6 4 3 21 set of 4 (1/8), (1/12)
6 5 3 27 (1/8) (1/8), (1/12)
5 3 1 8 set of 4 (1/8), (1/12)
7 4 2 15 set of 4 (1/8), (1/12)
9 5 3 18 set of 4 (1/8), (1/12)
4 2 1 1398 set of 4 (1/12)
5 2 1 10 set of 4 (1/8)
6 3 1 30 set of 4 (1/8), (1/12)
7 3 1 6 set of 4 (1/8)
6 3 2 645 set of 4 (1/12), (1/8)
7 3 2 15 set of 4 (1/8)
Table 8: Results for (one own / one opponent) memory, if strategies also play
against themselves. “set of 4” consists of four strategies: (0/0), (0/2), (0/8),
(0/10). All strategies that win the tournament coo¨perate in the first iteration
and at least continue to coo¨perate upon mutual coo¨peration (1/ ≥ 8). (1/12)
(TFT) is not among the winners, if b > a + 1. (?/9) is the strategy that
sticks with its behavior, if the opponent has coo¨perated and else changes it,
i.e. it is “pavlov”. (1/8) can also be seen as a pavlovian strategy, but a more
content one than (1/9) – happy with anything than S and thus repeating the
previous behavior except if having received S. No rule is among the winners,
that continues coo¨peration, if the opponent has defected. (Strategy (0/2) would
do so, but it never can reach the state that it coo¨perates.)
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T R P First it. G1i Tournament
3 2 1 34 set of 4 (1/8), (1/12)
4 3 1 29 (1/8) (1/8), (1/12)
5 3 2 30 set of 4 (1/8), (1/12)
5 4 2 42 (1/8) (1/8), (1/12)
6 5 2 18 (1/8) (1/8), (1/12)
4 3 2 23 set of 4 (1/8), (1/12)
6 4 3 39 set of 4 (1/8), (1/12)
6 5 3 53 (1/8) (1/8), (1/12)
5 3 1 363 set of 4 (1/8), (1/12)
7 4 2 57 set of 4 (1/8), (1/12)
9 5 3 163 set of 4 (1/12), (1/8)
4 2 1 49 set of 4 set of 4
5 2 1 69 set of 4 set of 4
6 3 1 9 set of 4 set of 4
7 3 1 7 set of 4 set of 4
6 3 2 66 set of 4 set of 4, (0/4)
7 3 2 141 set of 4 set of 4 altern. ((0/4), (1/4))
Table 9: Results for (one own / one opponent) memory, if strategies do not play
against themselves. “set of 4” consists of four strategies: (0/0), (0/2), (0/8),
(0/10).
6.3 Results for No-Own-Two-Opponent Memory
Now 10,000 iteration steps were carried out. Again this is far more than the
largest number of iterations before the process settles down in some way. Now
TFT is (1/2/12) and TF2T is (1/3/14). Results are shown in tables 10 and 11.
6.4 Results for One-Own-Two-Opponent Memory
In this case, one could in principle reduce the size of the strategy, as it makes
no sense to distinguish between strategies that coo¨perate or defect in the second
iteration, if hypothetically they coo¨perate in the first iteration, when in fact they
defect in the first iteration. For the simulation the number of strategies has not
been reduced to the subset of distinguishable ones, as this would have been a
source of error for the source code, and at this stage, the effect on required
resources for computation is negligible. Thus for each strategy there are three
more that yield exactly the same results against each of the strategies. In the
table of results (table 12) just one of the four equivalent strategies is given – the
one with the smallest number. This means that in case of initial defection adding
2, 8, or 10 to the middle number gives the equivalent strategies and in case of
initial coo¨peration, it is 1, 4, or 5. Therefore TFT is (1/8/240), (1/9/240),
(1/12/240), and/or (1/13/240). Even when the results are reduced by naming
only one of four strategies linked in this way, this is the first configuration, where
15
T R P First it. G1i Tournament
3 2 1 383 (1/2/2) (1/2/10), (1/3/10),
(1/2/12), (1/3/12)
4 3 1 350 (1/2/2) (1/3/10), (1/2/14)
5 3 2 179 (0/0/2) (1/2/10), (1/3/10),
(1/2/12), (1/3/12)
5 4 2 422 (1/2/2) (1/2/10), (1/3/10), (1/2/12),
(1/3/12), (1/2/14), (1/3/14)
6 5 2 397 (1/2/2) (1/2/10), (1/3/10), (1/2/12),
(1/3/12), (1/2/14), (1/3/14)
4 3 2 53 (0/0/0) (1/2/10), (1/3/10), (1/2/12),
(1/3/12), (1/2/14), (1/3/14)
6 4 3 35 (0/0/0) (1/2/8), (1/3/8), (1/2/10),
(1/3/10), (1/2/12), (1/3/12)
6 5 3 1076 (0/0/0) (1/3/10)
5 3 1 215 (1/2/2) (0/3/2)
7 4 2 527 (1/2/2) (0/3/2)
9 5 3 2123 (1/2/2) (1/3/10), (1/3/12)
4 2 1 719 (2) (1/2/2) (1/2/4) altern. (0/3/4)
5 2 1 1283 (2) (0/0/2) (0/2/4) altern. (0/3/4)
6 3 1 299 (4) (1/2/2) (1/0/2)
7 3 1 395 (4) (1/2/2) (1/0/2)
6 3 2 41 (2) (0/0/2) (1/2/4) altern. (0/3/4)
7 3 2 127 (2) (0/0/2) (1/2/4) altern. (0/3/4)
Table 10: Results for (no own / two opponent) memory, if strategies also
play against themselves. For 6-3-1 (1/0/2) wins two iteration rounds and then
(0/1/2) and then (0/1/2) and (0/3/2) win. For 7-3-1 it is similar, but (0/3/2)
does never win. Compared to Table 5 TFT (1/2/12) (or even more coo¨perative
strategies) mostly reappears, only disappears as winner of the tournament for 6-
5-3, but newly wins 9-5-3. Thus, the general tendency that payoff matrices with
b ≤ 1 produce more coo¨peration is kept, but softened. The most coo¨perative
strategy co-winning a tournament is (1/3/14), which only defects, if it remem-
bers two defections of the opponent. Overall – compared to the settings with
smaller memory – the dominance of “always defect” has vanished, especially in
the first round of the tournament.
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T R P First it. G1i Tournament
3 2 1 959 (1/2/2) (1/3/10), (1/3/12)
4 3 1 219 (1/2/2) (1/3/10), (1/3/12), (1/3/14)
5 3 2 179 (0/0/2) (1/3/10), (1/3/12)
5 4 2 720 (1/2/2) (1/3/10)
6 5 2 619 (1/2/2) (0/3/14)
4 3 2 276 (0/0/0) (1/2/10), (1/3/10), (1/2/12),
(1/3/12), (1/2/14), (1/3/14)
6 4 3 38 (0/0/0) (1/2/8), (1/3/8), (1/2/10),
(1/3/10), (1/2/12), (1/3/12)
6 5 3 422 (0/0/0) (1/3/10), (1/0/12), (0/3/14)
5 3 1 359 (1/2/2) (0/3/2)
7 4 2 1224 (3) (0/0/2) (1/2/4), (0/2/4)
9 5 3 1644 (3) (0/0/2) (1/2/4), (0/2/4)
4 2 1 2891 (2) (0/0/2) (0/2/4), ((1/2/4) alt. (0/3/4))
5 2 1 13 (2) (0/0/2) (0/2/4), (0/3/4)
6 3 1 515 (4) (1/2/2) (1/0/2)
7 3 1 731 (1/2/2) (1/0/2)
6 3 2 85 (2) (0/0/2) (0/2/4), ((1/2/4) alt. (0/3/4))
7 3 2 115 (2) (0/0/2) (0/2/4), ((1/2/4) alt. (0/3/4))
Table 11: Results for (no own / two opponent) memory, if strategies do not
play against themselves. For payoff 7-4-2 and 9-5-3 (0/2/4) co-wins in 2 out of
3 rounds. The comparison to Table 6 reveals that increasing memory size makes
coo¨perative strategies much more successful for almost all payoff matrices. None
of the payoff matrices that produced oscillating results with size-one memory
do so with size-two memory and vice versa.
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the results are too complicated to be understandable at a glance.
There are even more strategies that yield identical results in any combination
with any other player: for all strategies that continue to defect (coo¨perate) on
own defection (coo¨peration) those elements of the strategy that determine what
to do, following an own coo¨peration (defection) are never applied and the value
of these elements has no effect. This phenomenon leads to a large number of
strategies winning the tournament. Interestingly for some of the payoff matrices
the number of winners is smaller around 20 or 30 iterations than at larger
numbers of iterations.
For this memory configuration there is almost no difference in the results,
if strategies play against themselves or not: the strategies with the most points
in the first round of the tournament, and the number of strategies winning the
tournament are the same in both cases. Only if the number of strategies winning
the tournament is large, a small number of strategies might be exchanged and
the iteration round, when the results are stable, is different. In iteration rounds
before stability, there can be larger differences, however. We refrain from giving
a result table for the case when strategies do not play against themselves.
6.5 Results for Two-Own-One-Opponent Memory
This configuration is interesting as one can interpret a strategy considering
a remembered opponent’s action as reaction to an as well remembered own
action. While TFT is (1/8/240), a strategy additionally coo¨perating in such
a case would be (1/8/244). As Table 13 shows, sometimes only TFT appears
among the winners of the tournament, sometimes both these strategies. Only
with payoff matrix 6-5-2 the more forgiving strategy wins but not TFT. It is
the more tricky strategy (1/8/228) that applies this kind of forgiveness, which
is more successful than TFT.
In this setting as well, it has only minor effects if a strategy plays against
itself or not. Therefore the results for the case when they do not is omitted.
6.6 Results for No-Own-Three-Opponent Memory
Regarding the number of strategies this setting is the largest investigated in this
work. The number of iterations until the results settle varies greatly among the
various payoff matrices. In fact for some payoff matrices they did not stabi-
lize before the 30,000th iteration. At this point we refrained from performing
further calculations and accepted the (non-)result as open issue for future inves-
tigations. However, even for payoff matrices with which stable results appear
to have been reached it cannot be excluded that after some 10,000 iterations
more different winners would result, as in the more volatile cases. Another sur-
prising observation was that the results sometimes appeared to have reached
a final state but then started changing again. After all, for remembering one
opponent’s action, stable results appeared after approximately 10 iterations,
for remembering two opponents’ moves it was about 1,000 iterations. So, it is
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T R P First it. G1i Tournament
3 2 1 1436 set of 4 set of 22, set of 17
4 3 1 998 set of 4 set of 22, set of 20
5 3 2 134 set of 4 set of 22, set of 13
5 4 2 234 set of 4 set of 22, set of 19
6 5 2 804 (1/10/160) set of 22, set of 39
4 3 2 1838 set of 4 set of 22, set of 37
6 4 3 794 set of 4 set of 22, set of 30
6 5 3 929 (1/10/160) set of 22, set of 25
5 3 1 2188 set of 4 set of 22, (1/10/148)
7 4 2 39 set of 4 set of 22, (1/10/148)
9 5 3 45 set of 4 set of 22, (1/10/148)
4 2 1 412 set of 4 (0/1∨5/180∨244),
(0/5/176∨244)
5 2 1 278 set of 4 (0/1/180)
6 3 1 133 (2) set of 4 (0/1∨5/180∨244),
(0/5/176∨244), (0/1/244)
7 3 1 2174 set of 4 (0/1/180)
6 3 2 324 set of 4 (0/1∨5/180∨244),
(0/5/176∨244)
7 3 2 422 set of 4 (0/1/180)
Table 12: Results for (one own / two opponent) memory, if strategies also
play against themselves. The “∨” is used as the common meaning of “or”.
(1/10/160) coo¨perates in the first and second iteration and then continues to
coo¨perate, if both strategies have coo¨perated, else it defects. This implies
that it does not make use of the second to last iteration and is thus sim-
pler than possible. Except for the definite coo¨peration in the second itera-
tion, it is strategy (1/8) from the (one / one) setting. “set of 4” consists of
(0/0/1∨9∨129∨137), which all do make use of the information on the opponent’s
second to last action. “set of 22” is (1/8∨10/176∨180∨208∨212∨240∨244),
(1/8/144∨146∨148∨150∨178∨182∨210∨214∨242∨246) and by this includes
TFT. “set of 13” is (1/10/148), (1/8∨10/132∨140∨164∨196∨204∨228).
“set of 17” includes “set of 13”, (1/8/168∨172∨232), and (1/10/144).
“set of 30” contains “set of 13”, (1/8∨/10/128∨136∨160∨192∨200∨224),
(1/8/130∨162∨194∨226), and (1/10/144). “set of 37” consists of “set of
30”, (1/8∨10/168∨172∨232), and (1/10/236). The remaining four sets
(“set of 20”, “set of 39”, “set of 25”, and “set of 29”) share in common
(1/10/168∨172∨184∨188∨204∨232∨236∨248∨252), which includes TF2T. A to-
tal of 41 further strategies appear as members of these sets, of which a majority
(28) have not appeared earlier in this table and table’s caption.
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T R P First it. G1i Tournament
3 2 1 539 (2) (0/1/4) (1/8∨10/164∨228),
(1/10/set of 13 altern. set of 14)
4 3 1 338 (0/1/4) (1/8/228∨229)
5 3 2 8367 (0/1/4) (1/8/228)
5 4 2 107 (0/1/4) (1/8∨10/224∨228∨240∨244),
(1/10/set of 14)
6 5 2 111 (0/1/4) (1/8/228∨229∨244)
4 3 2 3768 (0/1/4) (1/8∨10/224∨228∨240),
(1/10/set of 11)
6 4 3 242 (0/1/4) (1/8∨10/164∨224∨228∨240),
(1/10/set of 12)
6 5 3 483 (0/1/4) (1/8/224∨228∨240∨244)
5 3 1 106 (0/1/4) (1/8∨10/164∨228),
(1/10/160∨161∨176∨177∨224∨225∨240∨241)
7 4 2 5989 (4) (0/1/4) (1/8∨10/160∨176∨224), (1/10/240)
9 5 3 350 (0/1/4) (1/8∨10/160∨176∨224), (1/10/240)
4 2 1 32 (2) (0/1/4) (1/8/224∨160∨176)
5 2 1 32 (0/1/4) (0/5/224)
6 3 1 407 (2) (0/1/4) (1/8/160∨161∨176∨177∨224∨225),
altern. (0/5/224∨225)
7 3 1 29 (0/1/4) (0/5/224∨225)
6 3 2 37 (2) (0/1/4) (1/8/160∨176∨224), altern. (0/5/224)
7 3 2 35 (0/1/4) (0/5/224)
Table 13: Results for (two own / one opponent) memory, if strategies also
play against themselves. For the payoff matrices from the top down to 5-3-1
strategy (1/8/228) always is among the winners of the tournament. It is the
strategy that almost plays tit for tat, but does not coo¨perate, if the opponent
has coo¨perated and itself has defected two times, but does coo¨perate, if the
opponent has defected after itself has defected, even, if itself has coo¨perated in
the most recent game. For the winner strategy (0/1/4) of the first round of
the tournament, this history is even the only case when it coo¨perates. For the
payoff matrices 5-3-2 and 7-4-2 20,000 iterations were calculated to verify the
late stability, respectively period 4.
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not unrealistic to assume that remembering three opponents’ actions may need
100,000 or even more iterations until the results do not change anymore.
Further difficulties may arise from precision issues in the calculation. During
the tournament it is decided by comparison with the average of points, if the
strategies may participate in the next round. The average is calculated by
dividing one very large number by another very large number. As a consequence
the size comparison between average and individual result may be faulty, if in
fact a strategy has exactly achieved the average of points and by this kicked out
of the tournament. Another resource problem is the possibility that the sum of
points produces an overflow in the corresponding integer variable. That such
considerations could be relevant when dealing with such large numbers is based
on general experience with complex simulations; in the results there was no
explicit hint that such issues really occured, except for that the long instability
of results that appeared to be surprising in principle could be attributed to
them. Ruling them out would need a second computer system with different
hardware architecture or a very thorough understanding of the CPU and the
compiler that were used. None of these were sufficiently available. Additionally
one has to consider that each simulation run currently takes days to arrive at the
number of iterations where these issues could be relevant. In a nutshell: using
up-to-date standard computer systems the no-own-three-opponent-memory case
today is at the edge of what is accessible. Definately ruling out negative effects
that falsify the results and doing this with maintainable effort remains to be
done in the future.
As calculating the payoff and evaluating the tournament takes more compu-
tation time than calculating the results of the dilemma, beyond 10,000 iterations
only for the last one hundred iterations ahead of the full thousands payoff and
tournament were calculated. This in turn implies that the iteration number after
which the results did not change anymore can only be given approximately.
Having said all this, it becomes obvious that the results of this section need
to be considered as preliminary – the more the later the assumed stability was
observed.
A different problem is that in some cases the number of winners of the tour-
nament is too large to give all of the winning strategies in this paper. However,
the remaining cases should be sufficient to demonstrate the type and especially
variants of strategies winning the tournament
A majority of the strategies winning the first round of the tournament
coo¨perate, when the earliest opponent’s action they remember was coo¨pera-
tion and any other defection. This is a trend which was already present with
the one element smaller memory, but it was not as pronounced. This strategy
is interesting in a sense as it uses the last chance to avoid breaking entirely
with the opponent. To find a catchy name for this strategy, recall Mephisto’s
behavior toward God in the Prologue in Heaven of Faust I: “The ancient one I
like sometimes to see, And not to break with him am always civil”1, where even
1The German original “Von Zeit zu Zeit seh ich den Alten gern, und hu¨te mich mit ihm
zu brechen.” even more stresses the occasional character of the coo¨perative interaction.
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considering all the competition between the two, Mephisto avoids entirely aban-
doning coo¨peration. If one extrapolates Mephisto to even larger memory sizes,
coo¨peration vanishes more and more, although there is some basic coo¨perative
tendency kept in the strategy. There are two questions: if this trend would
actually continue infinitely, when memory size is increased further, and what it
means that for example the case of one-own-two-opponent-memory-size yields
strategies as winners of the first round of the tournament that have entirely
different characteristics.
The results are shown in table 14.
7 Summary and Outlook
The calculations of this work reveal a strong dependence of the results of the
tournament on the details of the payoff matrix. It is not sufficient to distinguish,
if T + S = R+ P and 2R > T + S hold or not. This means that one has to be
careful drawing conclusions, if the prisoner’s dilemma is used as a toy model for
some real system. Of course, as this work restricted strategies to limited memory
size, there might be strategies relying on infinite memory that outperform all
of these regardless of the details of the payoff matrix. So, the main result of
this work is not that everything changes with a different payoff matrix, but that
one should not be too faithful that the precise choice of the payoff matrix is
irrelevant.
As expected the two basic relations T + S = R+ P and 2R > T + S clearly
have an influence on the results, as subsets of strategies appear among the
winners in tendency depending if these relations hold or if they do not so. The
picture is a bit different for the winner of the first round of the tournament, when
all strategies still participate: there are fewer strategies appearing as winners,
but if there is more than one for a memory configuration, there is no obvious
pattern based on these relations that tells which strategy wins if a specific payoff
matrix is applied. In total, one cannot claim that the details of the payoff matrix
will dominate each element of the results in any case. However, in general one
can say that the results do depend on the specific choice of the payoff matrix.
Furthermore it is not only not possible to find one generally best or a set of
generally best strategies, but – if one compares the winners of the first round
of the tournament and the tournament as a whole – even for a specific payoff
matrix it cannot be decided in general, if coo¨perating is a good or bad idea, as
this depends on the kind of result that decides about the winner.
While for these reasons, it is usually not possible to use the prisoner’s
dilemma as some kind of proof that in some real system coo¨perating yields
best payoff, the results of this work – as of a lot of preceding works – helps to
bear in remembrance that coo¨perating might be the better idea, even if at first
sight one might have the opposite impression. The iterated prisoner’s dilemma
obviously is an abstract and simplified model for any real social system and
the four entries of the payoff matrix often are not set quantitatively by the real
system. In such cases conclusions drawn from calculations can only be valid if
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T R P First it. G1i Tournament
3 2 1 ≈ 24,000 (1/2/2/2) 138 strategies
4 3 1 ≈ 27,000 (0/0/0/9) (1/0/10/246), (1/0/14/230),
(1/0/11/230∨246), (1/0∨1/14/236∨246),
(1/0∨1/15/228∨230∨236∨246)
5 3 2 ≈ 9,000 (0/0/0/2) 117 strategies e.g.
(1/2∨3/12∨13∨14∨15/162∨164∨228∨240)
5 4 2 - (1/2/2/2) (0/2/7/230),
(0/0/15/230), (0/2/230∨238)
6 5 2 ≈ 21,000 (1/2/2/2) (0/1∨3/10∨11/230∨246∨254),
(0/0∨1∨2∨3∨8∨9∨10∨11/230∨246∨254)
4 3 2 ≈ 22,000 (0/0/0/2) 136 strategies e.g.
(1/2/12/166), (1/3/8/240), (1/3/15/252)
6 4 3 ≈ 22,000 (0/0/0/2) 207 strategies e.g.
(1/2/12/160), (1/3/8/240), (1/3/15/248)
6 5 3 ≈ 9,000 (0/0/0/2) (0/1∨3/10∨11/230∨246∨254),
(0/3/0∨1∨8∨9∨10∨11/230)
5 3 1 678 (0/0/0/9) 74 strategies e.g.
(1/2∨3/12∨13∨14∨15/162∨176∨228∨240)
7 4 2 ≈ 9,000 (1/2/10/2) 78 strategies e.g.
(1/2∨3/12∨13∨14∨15/162∨176∨228∨240)
9 5 3 ≈ 12,000 (0/0/0/2) 80 strategies e.g.
(1/2∨3/12∨13∨14∨15/162∨176∨228∨240)
4 2 1 609 (2) (0/0/0/2) (1/3/8∨9/226) alt. (0/3/13∨15/226)
5 2 1 1695 (0/0/0/2) (0/3/13/226)
6 3 1 1923 (2) (1/2/10/2) (1/3/8∨9/226) alt. (0/3/13∨15/226)
7 3 1 ≈ 9,000 (1/2/10/2) (0/3/13/226)
6 3 2 ≈ 9,000 (2) (0/0/0/2) (0/3/15/226) alt.
(1/3/8∨9/226), (1/3/9/240)
7 3 2 1229 (0/0/0/2) (0/3/13/226)
Table 14: Results for remembering three preceding opponents’ actions. (Strate-
gies do play against themselves.) For 5-4-2-0 after a varying number of iterations
(roughly 10) another result with 14 tournament winning strategies appears.
These do not include the 6 given here
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the results do not significantly depend on details of the payoff matrix.
In some cases the results stabilized only after a very large number of iter-
ations, a number far larger than for example the number of iterations in the
tournaments performed by Axelrod [2]. This does not necessarily mean that it
is useless to investigate cases with fewer iterations, as also before the results
stabilize, the results oscillate between two sets or between a set and a proper
subset. As the number of iterations for stability grows with the number of
participating strategies and as the number of participating strategies is already
quite large in cases, when stability only occurs beyond 1000 iterations, one can
assume that for most investigations of the iterated prisoner’s dilemma that have
been published so far, the number of iterations was sufficiently high. Still, the
results of this work indicate that an investigation of the effect of having ±20
iterations usually should be worth the effort.
The results show a tendency that for increased memory size somewhat
coo¨perative strategies score better. There have been investigations on the de-
pendency of good memory and scoring in an iterated prisoner’s dilemma [47, 48],
however, the facing work is rather indifferent on this issue. With memory size
also the number of strategies increases and coo¨perative strategies find more
strategies that coo¨perate as well. A comparison of Tables 5 and 6 supports this
idea, as it shows how it benefits coo¨perative strategies, when there is one more
coo¨perative counterpart (themselves) participating in the tournament. The fact
that with increasing memory size in the end it does not play any further role,
if strategies play themselves or not, shows that in these cases the strategies are
related to some of the others, in a way that in effect playing against them is as
playing against themselves. On the other hand, if a good memory would not
matter then there should be more strategies among the winners that do not
make use of principally available more past information.
In this work the results have mainly been presented and – despite the consid-
erable extent of the paper – only scarcely been analyzed and discussed. There
are plenty of possibilities to discuss the success or poor performance of a spe-
cific strategy in a specific memory configuration with a specific payoff matrix in
analytical terms. For settings that yield large sets of tournament winners, the
results can be investigated statistically. Once stronger computational resources
are available larger memories can be investigated and the case of remembering
three opponent’s actions can be investigated more reliable.
In this work the idea was to simulate as many rounds as are necessary to
yield stable results. The development of the results over the rounds was not
and thus could be investigated in further studies.
For the tournament itself one can think of many variants. One could for ex-
ample only eliminate those strategies scoring worst in an iteration, or eliminate
always (as far as possible) exactly half of the strategies still running. It is also
possible to allow initial population weights different than one.
And finally the role of the payoff matrix can be investigated in greater depth.
In this work no two payoff matrices always gave the same result (although the
results of 7-4-2 and 9-5-3 were always at least similar). Is it possible at all that
two payoff matrices that are not related trivially yield the same results? And
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if this is the case, what is (if it exists) the simplest parametrization and set of
relations between the parameters, which generates all payoff matrices that yield
all possible results? Can the winning strategies or the number of iterations until
stability be derived analytically?
The differences between the results with different payoff matrices might as
well reduce, if the tournament were not carried out in a binary way, but if
the frequency of a strategy could take a real value and frequencies of a round
were dependent on the score (fitness) of the preceding round. It would then be
possible for a strategy to score below average for example in the first round, but
recover in subsequent rounds.
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